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1Abstract
The electric power system is one of the largest complex adaptive systems,
yet its centralized electromechanical operation remains unaltered since its
invention in the last century. This model used to be adequate for the previous
decades. However, energy demand continuously increases and we will soon
be unable to satisfy it with current technology. Additionally, there is a need
for reduction in CO2 emissions. More specically, in the U.K., the 2008
Climate Change Act mandates an 80% CO2 emission reduction by 2050.
These facts will inevitably lead to the mainstream usage of renewable energy
systems during the following years. Moreover, today's power system lacks
transparency as customers have no way of monitoring and controlling their
energy usage besides reading their monthly bills, communication is one-way,
and there is no real supervision of the distribution system. All these factors
led researchers to the quest for a new power system model, which was named
the Smart Grid. This model is inuenced by the World Wide Web, operating
in a decentralized manner, with many producers and consumers of various
generation capabilities and consumption patterns. Consumers are able to
obtain real-time information on their energy and carbon footprints with the
use of smart-metering devices but, most important, are capable of responding
appropriately to signals they receive from the Grid. Along with the technical
issues, a transformation of current business models is essential. Although
electricity market deregulation has decreased wholesale prices, this change
has not been perceived by nal customers. This is due to the fact that
most of electricity trading is performed through long-term contracts between
generators and suppliers via risk management instruments so that customers
can pay xed prices no matter what is the true cost of delivery on behalf of the
utilities. In this project we have made an eort to study customer bill savings
for a variety of electricity taris on real data from a U.K. neighbourhood.
New types of taris that have been previously applied to large industrial and
commercial clients have been tested on a population of residential customer
agents. To our knowledge, this is the rst time that an agent-based simulation
for this type of taris has been performed in the U.K. based on a realistic
wholesale market setting. Our results show that both customers and suppliers
could benet from real-time pricing rates in terms of prot attained as well
as corresponding risk.Acknowledgements
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5Chapter 1
Introduction
Electricity is undoubtedly one of the most valuable modern commodities
and probably the most important human invention of the 20th century. Peo-
ple nowadays have a huge variety of appliances that provide comfortability
and quality of life, such as electric ovens, televisions and mobile phones that
could not otherwise operate without the existence of current power systems.
Additionaly, other commodities that are considered de facto and are essential
for our survival, such as light and heating, utilize electricity as raw material.
However, electricity demand levels continuously increase along with prosper-
ity levels, something which was not expected when the rst power systems
were implemented, so current electricity infrastructure is strained and a re-
design of the whole system seems necessary. Governments and professionals
have well understood this problem and are now making strong eorts to
achieve this change. This can only be done by upgrading current old systems
and enhancing them with new types of sources, such as renewable solar or
wind power, as well with novel ways of managing the trading of this unique
commodity. So, let's take a closer look to their plans for the electricity future.
1.1 The Smart Grid
It was little more than a century ago when Thomas Alva Edison launched
his company to provide electric lighting to the general public, signaling the
advent of the electricity industry. However, Edison was one of the most
fanatic proponents of direct current (DC) systems which had severe prob-
lems with transmission losses. This is the main reason for the prevalence
of alternating current (AC) technologies, as was early foreseen by George
6Westinghouse, one of Edison's strongest competitors. Nevertheless, it was
undoubtedly Samuel Insull who pioneered the business model of electricity
markets. Insull soon realized that loads should be expanded and integrated
so that generation expenses could be evenly distributed among customers,
hence a regulated natural monopoly seemed to serve his ideas in the most
ecient manner. Vertical integration was the dominant business model until
1990 when market deregulation made its appearance.
But, unlike most modern industries which started reforming their oper-
ation 25 years ago, exploiting the advances in information and communica-
tion technologies (ICT), current electric power system has preserved its old
electromechanical properties since its invention with the exception of minor
additions of monitoring facilities to the transmission lines. This fact is not
in accordance with current needs. Electricity demand levels are continually
rising and this increase will be even more apparent with the adoption of plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), so new generation factories have to be
constructed and operated to cover this increase; it is important to note that,
currently, in the U.S., 25% of generation and 10% of distribution facilities are
necessary for serving only 400 hours of energy per year [10]. Additionally,
electricity and information ow is one-way, so customers have no means of
measuring and eciently altering their consumption habits. Moreover, the
availability of fossil fuels is reaching its bottom line so incentives for investing
on renewable energy and storage instruments should be provided. However,
probably the most important side eect of today's electricity system is the
increasing levels of carbon dioxide emissions. Governments have well un-
derstood this problem and have agreed on measures to deal with it. More
specically, in the U.K. alone, carbon emissions are required to be reduced
by 80% until 2050, while at the same time the European Union mandates
the generation of 35% of total demand through renewable resources [11]. To
manage this scale of requirements a new revolution in the electricity land-
scape is necessary. This is the Smart (Electricity) Grid, shown in Figure
1.1.
According to Peter Fox-Penner, member of the Brattle Group consult-
ing rm, the Smart Grid is a way of "combining time-based prices with the
technologies that can be set by users to automatically control their use and
self-production, lowering their power cost and oering other benets such
as increased reliability to the system as a whole" [12]. Although there is no
unique denition, the Smart Grid vision encompasses the whole system, rang-
ing from the generation through the transmission and distribution networks
7Figure 1.1: Power - information ow under the traditional electricity system
and the Smart Grid [1].
to the customer part, and was successfully characterized as the "Internet of
Energy" [13].
Clark Gellings, Vice President of Technology at the Electric Power Re-
search Insitute (EPRI), identies some key properties of the Smart Grid
[14]: The Smart Grid should supply electricity reliably, optimally generating
and storing it, while at the same time incorporating distributed resources
and controllable loads to minimize cost. Production and delivery should be
secure and environment friendly and all critical components should be ef-
fectively monitored. Currently there is a variety of initiatives with dierent
viewpoints, but a common target, which is paving the way for the implemen-
tation of this new, innovative system [14]:
 IBM's Vision1: IBM emphasizes on the customer participation. They
believe that monitoring, smart metering and distributed generation
deployment using open standards will greatly inuence current industry
operation.
1http://www.ibm.com/iibv
8 IntelliGridSM2: EPRI's initiative proposes an implementation of a
platform where ICT and energy delivery are integrated.
 GridWiseTM3: This is a project of the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) which focuses on the implementation and deployment of modern
distributed generation facilities.
 U.K. SuperGen Initiative4: Two plans (mid-term and long-term) have
been set in the U.K. and are split into seven distinct workpackages,
ranging from system security and decentralization to customer partic-
ipation and micro-grid generation.
 European Union Smart Grid5: The European Union has initiated a
number of projects for the integration of renewable resources into the
grid. They insist on creating a common EU liberalized market where
all customers can participate as well as setting common standards and
regulations.
 General Electric (GE) Vision6: GE foresees a Grid which is smarter
than all its components and provides benets for both the utility and
ICT industry. They also emphasize on distributed generation, smart
homes exploiting demand response opportunities, plug-in electric vehi-
cles (PEVs) that store and produce energy, and ecient, secure, qual-
itative power delivery.
1.2 The Multi-Agent Systems Paradigm
The envisioned Smart Grid is a self organizing complex system (SOCS)
[15], as it is an open system which comprises diverse classes of self-interested
participants with various types of interactions, while at the same time man-
ages to settle at a macro-level emergent stable state. Hence, an agent-based
approach seems appropriate for modeling this electricity system.
There are many denitions for a software agent but the most widespread
is that of Michael Wooldridge and Nicholas R. Jennings according to which
2http://www.epri-intelligrid.com
3http://www.electricdistribution.ctc.com
4http://www.supergen-networks.org.uk
5http://www.smartgrids.eu
6http://www.gepower.com
9an agent is "a computer system that is situated in some environment, and
that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet
its delegated objectives" [16]. For the agent to be intelligent, it should also
be able to sense and react to changes in its environment (reactivity), to
take the initiative so as to achieve its targets (proactiveness), but also to be
capable of interacting with other entities in its environment (social ability)
[16]. Following their last property, agents are typically organized in societies,
called multi-agent systems (MAS) where they can cooperate or compete for
resources through a negotiation process.
Software agents can be useful to this new electricity system in a variety of
ways, but we can categorize them in two major areas. First of all, they can be
used for validation of any novel rule concerning structural reforms or business
models by simulating broad parts of the new, yet unseen, Smart Grid; the
recent Western U.S. energy crisis of 2000-2001 due to the gaming of the new
deregulated market from Enron led to an estimated cost of $33 billion for
the citizens of California, uncovering the need for cautious market design in
novel domains [12]. What's more, agent technology is now mature enough to
be incorporated in real systems. One of the key attributes of the Smart Grid
is real-time ow of information among its stakeholders (customers, utilities,
regulators, operators), hence it is almost impossible to analyze this huge
amount of data. Intelligent agents therefore can exploit the computational
abilities of modern computers to perform human tasks so as to optimally
serve their owner's objectives and at the same time guarantee the system's
security.
1.3 Problem Denition
As we have already mentioned, current electricity system provides the
customers with no means of measuring and controlling their loads and one
of the main targets of all Smart Grid initiatives is their equipment with ad-
vanced metering infrastructure (AMI) to aleviate this problem. Additionally,
more and more customers will begin to supply their homes with distributed
energy resources (DER) such as micro-storage devices, micro-combined heat
and power (CHP) systems, and small-scale renewable source generation sys-
tems. PEVs will also gradually replace conventional vehicles with the help
of initiatives such as this of U.S. president Barack Obama, who set a target
of one million electric cars in his country by 2015.
In this complex personal grid of heterogeneous, intermittent generation
10systems and consumption devices, a customer must learn how to optimally
utilize relevant technology to dynamically react to price signals sent by his
contracted retail service, known as demand response (DR), and exploit his
generation / storage capacity such that he maximizes his expected utility.
However, this is not the case for a typical person, who has neither the time
nor the expertise to handle this type of information. Additionally, electricity
market deregulation increases competition for suppliers who will soon be
able to provide dynamic pricing contracts to their customers based on their
consumption proles and running wholesale market prices, benets currently
enjoyed only by large industrial businesses. However, large-scale experiments
with real customers are dicult to conduct, as careful considerations have to
be made so that both customer participation is guaranteed for the results to
be valid but also great amounts of money are needed to provide customers
proper incentives in a realistic scenario. Thus, a simulation seems to t well
in this setting.
1.4 Dissertation Contribution
In this work, we have used real consumption data from a U.K. neigh-
borhood to assess the benets of real-time pricing. More specically, we
have implemented various types of electricity taris under a realistic market
scenario to compare customer monetary benets from switching to dynamic,
real-time pricing which is one of the most crucial parts of the new Smart Grid
paradigm. This is the rst time to our knowledge that a novel, two-part RTP
tari designed for industrial customers is tested on residential U.K. data.
Our results show that real-time pricing can benet both customers and
suppliers with dierent risk aversion levels as long as the tari is properly
designed and implemented. Classical nancial theory and risk management
were used and potentials for future widespread adoption seem to be favorable.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
The rest of this report is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we provide a short introduction to the current business
model of electricity markets. More specically, we shortly describe the oper-
ation of current U.K. electricity market as well as some common risk man-
agement instruments that constitute a crucial part of its trading.
11Chapter 3 provides a summary of previous agent-based models used in
the modelling, simulation and optimization of power systems and electricity
markets.
Then, in Chapter 4 we introduce the concept of demand response along
with its benets for all entities in the electricity landscape and issues arising
from its widespread application.
Chapter 5 deals with the challenge of designing electricity taris, listing
the advantages and disadvantages of commonly used as well as innovative
rates.
In Chapter 6, we present our analysis and simulation results for a pop-
ulation of customers under dierent tari charges as well as an attempt to
create portfolios of these taris.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this report and proposes directions for future
work.
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Electricity Markets
In this chapter, we rst make an introduction to the separate but equally
valuable parts of electricity markets after deregulation. We then discuss
about the details of the U.K. corresponding market and nally present some
basic economic notions from the eld of risk management, as it has been
applied in the electricity sector.
2.1 Market Operation
During the 20th century, the prevalent type of electricity business model
was that of the vertically integrated monopolies, where electricity providers
have unique access and control of the four main parts of the system [17]:
 Generation: comprises generating companies (gencos) that own power
plants of various technologies and sell the energy that has been pro-
duced as well as other services, such as voltage control and spinning
reserves (i.e. expensive but quickly available types of power generating
plants used to balance real time supply and demand).
 Transmission: is the high voltage electricity network through which
energy is transmitted over large distances so that losses are minimized.
Companies owning relevant equipment are called transmission compa-
nies (transcos) and their operation is controlled by the Independent
System Operator (ISO), which is responsible for the robust and safe
function of the whole system.
13 Distribution: is the low voltage (typically 220 Volts) electricity network
for the transmission of energy over medium and small distances, such as
cities or small regions. The entities comprising this network are called
distribution companies (discos) and operate under the supervision of
the ISO.
 Supply or retailing: consists of all retail companies (also called suppli-
ers) that resell energy to the nal customers (residential, commercial,
industrial), acting as intermediaries between them and the producers.
According to the vertical unbundling model (Figure 2.1), a publicly owned
utility was able to optimize both the operation and coordination of the afore-
mentioned substituent components but also to guarantee cheap, secure and
unfailing electricity supply for everyone, no matter what was the cost of in-
stallation and maintenance of the essential equipment for the utility. Hence,
given a xed, regulated prot percentage, utilities should only make an ef-
fort to minimize their short-term cost of operation and carefully dene their
long-term investment strategies. The latter was the main aw of this model,
as there was no real incentive or punishment of the involving parties for
any harmful decision, leading to signicant ineciencies and customer bill
increases [18].
Figure 2.1: Vertically integrated monopoly.
This fact was early seen by economists who believed that competition
could increase eciency and lower costs for the customers. Under this dereg-
ulated environment, which is continually expanding worldwide, generation
14and retail services are traded in their own free exchanges, whereas transmis-
sion and distribution networks operate under the supervision of a publicly
owned ISO (Figure 2.2). However, some economists insist that the latter
should also be deregulated using similar arguments as before [19].
Figure 2.2: Fully competitive electricity market.
2.2 The U.K. Market
After the end of the second world war, U.K. had nearly 560 utilities [20].
The grid was further separated in 14 areas with dierent ISOs. On 1990
the privatisation of the electricity market followed and an innovative for its
time day-ahead electricity pool market for wholesale trading was established.
Deregulation in England and Wales started at the same time, after the lib-
eralisation of the gas market, and continued in stages from 1998 until 2002.
Transmission and distribution (T&D) networks were gradually sold from mo-
nopolies to new players which were able to access all T&D information in a
transparent and fair way [21]. Current electricity market took its nal form
in 2000 with the introduction of the new electricity trading arrangements
(NETA) to replace the old daily pool market [22]. A nal transformation
15to include Scottish operators was implemented in 2005 (known as BETTA)
[23]. According to this new mechanism, there are two organized markets,
the UK pool exchange (UKPX) and the balancing market. However, the
majority of trading (almost 95% [24]) is performed via bilateral long-term
agreements, called the over-the-counter (OTC) market. UKPX is a day-
ahead uniform price market, providing half-hourly spot prices (equal to the
system marginal price), based on participants' initial physical notications
one day before actual consumption, and closes one hour before real-time en-
ergy dispatch, called the "gate closure", when participants report their nal
physical positions (i.e. predicted aggregate load and generation bids). After
that, a discriminatory pricing balancing market is operated by the ISO which
receives bids for real-time power supply (from expensive but exible gener-
ators oering ancillary services) and demand (from utilities with underesti-
mated consumption predictions) increments/decrements (called top-ups and
spillages respectively) such that any time demand is equal to supply. Top-
ups are charged at the system buy price (SBP) whereas spillages are priced at
the corresponding sell price (SSP). SBP and SSP are generally unprotable
for the trading counterparts to deter arbitrage opportunities. Only a small
percentage of electricity, nearly 3%, is traded in this market and participa-
tion is voluntary. Currently, there are 12 active electricity and gas utilities
in England and Wales [20].
2.3 Risk Management
Energy trading is a new, complex and volatile market as electricity is a
ow commodity, which means that demand must always equal supply in real
time, and extremely expensive to store in large amounts. Another reason is
that the quality of transmitted power (i.e. A.C. frequency) must remain in
acceptable levels to achieve reliable and safe operation. Moreover, electricity
value is highly driven by weather conditions and market operations for the
relevant raw materials used to produce it [25].
Given this complexity, a market participant faces high levels of uncer-
tainty in both prices (price risk) and quantities (volumetric risk) traded.
The former is linked to the volatility in spot prices due to uncertainty be-
cause of its competitor and counterpart strategies, whereas the latter refers
to the uncertainty due to customer power consumption variation. Hence, risk
management strategies which transfer the risk to other parties and protect
against large losses are commonly used in energy markets.
16The vast majority of electricity trading between suppliers and generators
is conducted via bilateral forward contracts. A forward is a contract for
the obligation of delivery on a specic future date of a prespecied quantity
of power at a predetermined price (called the strike price). In this way
both suppliers and generators hedge their risk against spot price volatility.
The payo of such a contract is equal to the dierence between spot prices
at delivery date and agreed price [26]. A similar instrument is the future
contract, which has the same structure as a forward but is only traded in
organized exchanges and it usually encompasses small quantity values.
A typical forward contract duration can range from few days to some years
ahead. As energy has to be continuously delivered, both trading counterparts
have to construct short-term and long-term forward curves which can be
viewed as portfolios of daily forward contracts for a specied period, creating
positive or negative cash ows as Figure 2.3 illustrates. In this case, the
buyer of the forward receives an amount which is equal to the dierence of
the average spot price for the period agreed from the corresponding strike
price.
Figure 2.3: Constructed forward curve [2].
Another well known derivative is the option. This is a contract giving its
shareholder the right but not the obligation to buy (call option) or sell (put
option) a predetermined amount of electricity for a price. If the strike price
is lower (higher) than the spot price at expiration, then the owner of a call
(put) option can buy (sell) the underlying commodity and sell it back (buy
17it) at the wholesale market, making prot because of price dierences.
There is a great variety of other electricity derivatives for trading gen-
erated and transmitted electricity, borrowed from traditional markets ([26]
contains a summary of these). In all cases, an accurate model of the un-
derlying wholesale price movement is the most important ingredient of suc-
cessful management, which is far dierent than classical economic models, as
electricity exhibits strong mean reversion and does not follow a Geometric
Brownian motion [25]. Additionally, local service utilities must also hedge
their volumetric risk, which is usually done via weather derivatives.
18Chapter 3
Software Agents for Electricity
In this chapter, we describe available agent-based tools for the simulation
of the power system and electricity markets along with their pros and cons.
We then present some state-of-the-art studies that are focused on the Smart
Grid.
3.1 Available Tools
Electrical engineers, economists as well as computer scientists have long
used agent-based systems to model the broad electricity marketplace, ranging
from the customer to the producer level.
The Simulator for Electric Power Industry Agents (SEPIA) [27] is one of
the rst general purpose systems for modeling electricity markets. Simple
Reinforcement Learning techniques, such as the famous Q-learning [28] and
a modied version of the Roth Erev algorithm [29], are used to guide the
behavior of generators and suppliers. The latter are situated in virtual zones
(regions). However, there is no entity undertaking the role of the ISO. On
the other hand, the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS)
platform incorporates both an ISO and a regulator [30]. In EMCAS, there are
three business layers (bilateral contract, pool and transmission/distribution
market) along with the physical and regulatory ones. Moreover, there are six
distinct planning periods for the markets, ranging from the short-term real-
time to a year-ahead planning horizon for the generators, and their learning
can be categorized as either observation-based or exploration-based. MAIS
is an agent-based system that simulates U.S. wholesale prices and has been
tested on real data during the period of the California energy crisis [31]. A re-
19cent general-purpose platform is Sun and Tesfatsion's Agent-based Modeling
of Electricity System (AMES) framework, built on Repast 1, which is a Java-
based open-source platform, thus making it easily extensible [32]. Repast
was also the basis for the PowerACE system, which can be used to design
and evaluate new markets for the exchange of carbon-dioxide emissions [33].
A detailed review of the aforementioned systems can be found in [34] and
[35].
Bunn and Oliveira [22] made an eort to study the eects of the new
electricity trading arrangements (NETA) that have been recently applied
in the U.K. electricity market. More specically, they have modeled the
operation of the new pool and balancing markets on a single-day basis and
have shown that suppliers face a higher risk than producers in these new
markets. Additionally, producers' collusion possibilities increase with the
corresponding capacity margin when regulation is not enforced. Finally, their
results show that over-hedging can be unprotable for the suppliers and vice
versa. Similar studies for the Belgian [36] and the German [37] markets
provide insights on how both producers and the ISO could optimize their
operations with the use of linear programming techniques.
3.2 Novel Approaches for the Smart Grid
The advent of the Smart Grid has revived the interest of AI practition-
ers, as the need for automation of both home and market procedures creates
space for innovation. Vytelingum et al. [38] have recently presented a novel
mechanism to deal with the automated trading of electricity which is based
on the Continuous Double Auction (CDA). In their work, they incorporate
a fair congestion management framework for the transmission lines, so that
higher priced transactions are favored against lower ones, and there is a bal-
ancing mechanism for real-time management of demand and supply. The
authors validate their results using simple traditional as well as state-of-the
art CDA trading strategies, namely the Zero-Intelligence [39] and Adaptive
Aggressiveness [40] strategy respectively, which are able to achieve values of
eciency in the range of 86% - 99%. The same authors consider an agent-
based microstorage model to optimize (i.e. minimize cost) customers' indi-
vidual and aggregate loads [41]. They perform a game theoretic analysis and
empirically nd that 38% of the U.K. population will adopt storage at Nash
1http://repast.sourceforge.net
20equilibrium where an average saving of 8.54% is achieved in customer bills.
In a more recent work, they consider the same type of customers [42] study
another important eld, the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) power system, according
to which PEVs oer their batteries for load balancing (ancillary services)
when idle (90% of the time on average). More specically, they consider the
problem of PEVs coalition formation using simple adaptive strategies. V2G
is also the topic of Vandael et al. [43], who compare an optimal quadratic
programming solution with a MAS on how they manage to atten PHEV
load, thus inducing DSM. They conclude that the computationally tractable
solution using a MAS leads to a peak reduction of 5%. Vytelingum et al.
[44] present an environmentally friendly solution to the problem of optimiz-
ing storage for the consumers of a green energy utility through appropriate
control signals. This homeostatic-based control system achieves a reduction
up to 21% of green wastage for the utility and a corresponding decrease up
to 10% for the customer bills compared with a traditional real-time pricing
tari. Given the necessity of designing proper market rules for the electricity
industry, the Trading Agent Community 2, which has been organizing agent
competitions (known as TAC) since 2002, has announced the beginning of a
new game, called TAC Energy 3, for 2011. This game, which follows similar
concepts to the work of this dissertation, each entrant represents an energy
broker which oers appropriately designed taris to its customers based on
bilateral agreements with the producers. The latter can be conventional
power plants as well as factories exploiting intermittent, renewable types of
electricity, such as solar and wind power. The customers themselves could
own small CHP facilities that are able to feed back energy into the grid for
some monetary value. Finally, TAC Energy encompasses PEV consumers,
which agree on special taris for both energy consumption and feed-in. It
is important to note that it is the rst time that real data, taken from the
cities of Gopingen and Freiamt as part of the MeRegio project [45], for both
prices and consumer preference modeling are used in this competition.
2http://tradingagents.org
3http://www.tacenergy.org/
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Demand Response
In this chapter we introduce one of the most important parts for the
success of the Smart Grid, namely demand response. We rst present a
denition of this notion and then describe some common demand response
practices. Finally, we discuss about its importance giving concrete examples
of its success as well as relevant concerns.
4.1 Denition
One of the main problems of current electricity markets is the lack of
customer price elasticity of demand (i.e. percentage change in quantity in
response to a one percent change in price), as customers are only able to
communicate with their suppliers, paying at a xed price no matter what is
the underlying cost for the utility and hence are isolated from the wholesale
market, although there is an abundance of evidence suggesting that they
would otherwise respond to its dynamics [46]. This fact along with cus-
tomers' habits and low cost of electricity compared to output products for
the industrial sector provides generators opportunities for market power ex-
ercise and induces high price spikes [47]. Demand response is an eort to
alleviate this problem.
According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as demand re-
sponse (DR), also known as price-responsive demand (PRD), can be charac-
terized any "action taken to reduce electricity demand in response to price,
monetary incentives, or utility directives so as to maintain reliable electric
service or avoid high electricity prices" [3]. In other words, DR is any price-
based eort to increase customers' price elasticity of demand, as Figure 4.1
22illustrates. Sometimes direct load control (DLC) through appropriate signals
is also incorporated in this denition, although the term demand side man-
agement (DSM) was later adopted instead. DR not only reduces the risk of
black-outs but also leads to investment savings in generation (consequently
reducing carbon dioxide emissions) and increases market eciency by letting
customers manage their consumption based on the actual cost of production.
Figure 4.1: Eect of DR on electricity prices.
4.2 Categorization
DR schemes can be categorized in two broad classes, namely incentive-
based DR and time-based rates [48, 14]. The former comprises curtailment
rates (i.e. bill reduction for load reduction), ancillary services (i.e. bids for
load reduction in the ISO market), capacity markets (i.e. predetermined
load curtailments when capacity problems arise) as well as bidding programs
(where customers submit bids for load reduction based on their preferences),
whilst the latter refers to specic types of taris that indirectly incentivise
price-responsive customers to change their consumption patterns, such as
time-of-use (TOU) rates, real-time prices (RTP) and critical-peak pricing
taris (CPP) [3]. Customers perceive DR as either load reduction or load
deferral with varying degrees of comfort loss, although onsite generation can
minimize their impact. The amount of demand reduced is equivalent to the
oering of an equal (virtual) amount of generated load, so the term negawatt
was coined to characterize a watt of DR reduction.
23Independent System Operators (ISOs) and utilities worldwide accommo-
date various types of DR programs. In the U.S., we can distinguish the
following categories:[1, 49]:
 Emergency DR or installed capacity special case resources in extreme
situtations when demand curtailment is essential.
 Real-time DR during high pricing periods where customers are charged
at real-time or hourly taris. To reduce associated risks, in some cases,
customers are allowed to pay a prespecied amount of money for a per-
centage of their demand through forward energy contracts connected
to the wholesale market.
 Day-ahead DR, which comprises contracts with customers for reduction
based on the corresponding day-ahead market prices so that they are
able to more eectively plan and optimize their consumption pattern
for the next day
 Demand-side ancillary service program, where load savings are used as
spinning reserves and customers are usually rewarded with real-time
prices.
There are two major types of evaluation for DR impact, a retrospective
and a prospective [50]. The former is an ex-post evaluation where the amount
of load and expenses saved is calculated after the implementation of the DR
program, whereas the latter refers to the estimation of the program's impact
for future years (ex-ante). Common techniques to measure real impact is to
incorporate DR-free control groups, complex regression models to measure
both consumers' baseline loads and variability, so that only desirable stable
customers participate in the program [50].
4.3 Historical Facts
DR is not a new concept. First, William Vickrey in 1971 [51] and then
Fred Schweppe and his colleagues in the 1980s have expressed their ideas
for a price-responsive ecient and reliable Grid [52, 53, 54, 55]. However,
large industrial and commercial customers are the only participants enjoy-
ing its benets. In the U.S., only 5% of customers implement some form
of DR (see Figure 4.2), mostly through interruptible and TOU taris, al-
though there is a potential for a 37,500MW load decrease [3]. This fact can
24be linked to the absence of AMI for the majority of customers due to their
high cost of purchase and installation as Figure 4.3 illustrates. It is impor-
tant to note that according to FERC, only 259 among 2,620 utilities in the
U.S. have implemented some form of price-based DR [3], starting from sim-
ple performance-based contracts (i.e. contracts for eciency upgrades) and
then utilizing risk management instruments [56]. In the U.K., there are cur-
rently only two major, simple residential DR programs in the U.K., namely
Economy 7 and 10. The former provides seven hours of low prices during
the night and the latter oers ten hours of corresponding prices distributed
during a day [57]. However, in 2006 only 16% of U.K. citizens were sub-
scribed to Economy 7 program [58]. The Smart Grid will provide residential
customers, which account for 29% of total electricity in the U.K., advanced
DR programs, which will hopefully lead to overall electricity price reduction
and investment savings.
The rst DR program focused on the Smart Grid was Pacic North-
west National Laboratory's (PNNL's) Olympic Peninsula Project in Sequim,
Washington, U.S. [59]. The target of the project was to demonstrate reli-
able and robust operation of an isolated grid, called a microgrid, with the
utilization of intelligent appliances and control systems via a market-based
approach. More specically, there is a shadow market where both consumers
and suppliers submit bids for electricity at 5-minute intervals. One hun-
drend and twelve consumers were equipped with Whirlpool's appliances that
could send and receive control and pricing signals to reduce their load. Each
household was given an initial amount of money for the experiment to be
realistic and was then required to select a type of contract (TOU, CPP or
RTP taris). Although this is one of the most valuable projects, proving
the attainability of this new Grid, the implementation of similar experimen-
tal programs is dicult because of their prohibitive cost; for the Peninsula
Project, household equipment cost was approximately $1000 per customer
[12]).
4.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
According to S. Braithwait[49], average peak demand reduction for res-
idential customers varies from 10% to 50%, depending on the type of DR
program followed (taris used and incorporation of enabling technologies,
i.e. devices that facilitate control of appliances), but generally consumers
with high cooling or heating demand are the most responsive customers. It
25Figure 4.2: Demand response contributions by entity type and customer class
[3].
26Figure 4.3: Advanced metering infrastructure penetration by customer class
[3].
27is hence important to know the demand prole of a consumer as well as his
corresponding electric devices to be able to model and predict his behav-
ior. Thus, DR should be a three stages eort, starting from an individual
appliance through an in-home synchronization to a multi-consumer indirect
coordination [10].
DR benets include among others short-term market savings [47, 60, 48],
reducing price peaks and corresponding volatility, long-term savings from
deferral of unnecessary investments on power plants [61], reliability and power
quality guarantee [62], avoiding black-out eects (scientists from the EPRI
found out that the lack of DR was one of the main reasons that led to the
California's energy crisis [63]) as well as environmental benets [3].
On the other hand, there are some costs associated with DR implemen-
tation [48]. Besides relevant discomfort issues, customers have to install and
operate costly enabling technologies so that they can monitor and control
their appliances. Moreover, onsite generation imposes expensive investment
and running costs, such as fuel and maintenance expenses. Finally, customer
education is one of the most important issues for a utility, so personnel and
resources must be engaged.
Results for the customer response to DR are ambiguous. The vast ma-
jority of studies focuses on customer price elasticity of demand. However,
their results diverge as customers have dierent incentives for load reduc-
tion based on the type of project involved. When bill reductions or lack of
expenses are guaranteed, participants have no real incentives to realistically
alter their consumption pattern.
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Tari Design
In this chapter we delve into the details of the electricity taris that
are currently being implemented in residential and industrial settings. We
present the advantages and disadvantages of each tari and introduce the
novel, two-part real-time tari along with its variations.
5.1 Electricity Taris
One of the benets of DR is the potential for incorporating risk manage-
ment strategies for both suppliers and nal customers, thus hedging their
corresponding price risk. In this chapter, a variety of taris and relevant
hedging instruments are presented.
5.1.1 Flat rate
The simplest type of tari is the traditional at tari, according to which
each customer pays a xed price per KWh no matter how much it costs the
utility to deliver it, thus isolating retail from wholesale markets and creating
no real incentives for ecient price response. We can identify two main
cost components, namely the average delivery cost and the risk premium
for hedging spikes in the wholesale price [64, 65]. This tari has been the
prevalent type of pricing during the previous decades and inevitably increases
electricity bills as utilities have to hedge their risk on the long-term. A slightly
advanced version of this tari utilizes dierent price levels based on the season
that it is applied. As Ahmad Faruqui, member of the Brattle group energy
consulting rm, argues [9], a xed price tari is unfair as it incurs high levels
29of risk premiums and favors customers having positively correlated loads with
spot prices against negatively correlated ones. Moreover, it gives generators
the opportunity to exercise market power.
5.1.2 Increasing-block Tari
A variation of the at rate is the increasing-block tari [4], a ladder-like
pricing mechanism where customers pay a low, xed price until a consump-
tion threshold is reached after which they pay higher amount. There could
also be more than one thresholds (tiers) included in this tari. An exam-
ple of such a four-tier rate charged by Southern Electricity Edison utility is
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Increasing-block tari of Southern Electricity Edison utility [4].
5.1.3 Time-Of-Use Tari
The rst type of DR tari is the time-of-use (TOU) rate (Figure 5.2),
where each customer pays a higher amount of money (on-peak prices) for the
peak hours during the day and lower (o-peak) prices during the night, so
that they are incentivised to shift their load during low wholesale cost, daily
30periods. The risk premium in this case should be lower than the at-rate
one, as the supplier shares a portion of his risk with the customers. This
type of rate is more appropriate for customers who can defer or regularly
consume their loads during the night [47]. However, even in this case, prices
remain xed for a long time and do not adequately represent wholesale mar-
ket volatility. TOU programs started in the U.S. in 1975 with 16 dierent
programs sponsored by the Federal Energy Administration until 1981 [46, 3]
in ve dierent states. Since then, the vast majority of utilities have in-
corporated this tari in their programs. However, the dierence of on-peak
and o-peak rates should be carefully designed, otherwise trivial or unprof-
itable bill reductions can be observed, as was the case with the Puget Sound
Energy's program in 2001 [3]. Another variation of TOU prices is the vari-
able peak rate [66] where o-peak price remains xed but on-peak rate is
determined on a daily basis so as to reect spot prices.
Figure 5.2: Time-of-use tari.
5.1.4 Critical Peak Pricing
Highly peaked prices are usually observed for a small number of days
during a year, directly connected with extreme low or high temperatures.
Hence, another proposed tari, called Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) (Figure
5.3), charges customers extremely high prices (more than their real wholesale
counterpart) under predetermined trigger conditions for these days. This
type of rate is thus an additive one and can be combined with any other
31(usually TOU) tari. Several variations of this tari have been introduced
[3]: Fixed-price CPP (CPP-F) where there is a standard amount of time and
duration of critical events but no information about the days to be enforced
is provided. On the other hand, variable-period CPP (CPP-V) does not
incorporate any predened time, duration or day of price peaks. The variable
peak pricing (VPP) rate includes standard on- and o-peak prices but peak
prices are calculated based on the daily wholesale prices so as to link the
corresponding market with the retail one. VPP is thus a voluntary pricing
program. Finally, Critical Peak Rebate (CPR) is similar to CPP but instead
of paying extra charges during peak hours, customers are incentivised to
reduce their load by receiving a rebate for every KWh they save compared to
their historical CBL [67]. In the U.S., there are currently 25 utilities oering
CPP taris [3].
Figure 5.3: Critical peak pricing tari.
5.1.5 Real-Time Pricing Taris
Traditional Real-Time Pricing
Finally, the ultimate form of wholesale-retail market connection is the
real-time pricing (RTP) tari, according to which load consumption is charged
on an hourly or half-hourly basis, thus directly exposing wholesale prices to
the customers. RTP programs can incorporate day-ahead or day-of real-time
prices and can be mandatory or voluntary with varying social welfare expec-
tations [68, 3]. In the day-ahead RTP tari, customers are informed 24 hours
32in advance about the estimated prices so they are able to plan their next day
electricity usage or, sometimes hedge these prices with other nancial in-
struments. In this case, the supplier transfers the larger portion of its risk
to the customers, so only a small risk premium is charged. This premium
reects two major types of risks, the volumetric and the price risk. The
former refers to the utility's uncertainty for the actual aggregate load devi-
ation from the predicted one, as this deviation will have to be exchanged in
the expensive balancing market, whereas the latter refers to the uncertainty
on the spot prices due to competition. RTP programs especially benet
atter-load customers who are inevitably buying smaller electricity amounts
at cheaper prices, in contrast to peaky customers who would inevitably pay
more, although the corresponding risk premium is much lower [69]. It is
important to note that, although RTP programs have been in place since
mid-1980s for large industrial customers, it was only in 2003 when Common-
wealth Edison utility with the help of Center for Neighborhood Technology
(CNT) designed and started the rst residential RTP program in the U.S.,
called the Energy-Smart Pricing Plan [70]. Holland and Mansur [71] have
investigated the short-run benets of RTP using a simulation of the PJM
electricity market, and have shown that it can induce both consumer gains
(2.5% of the monthly bill) and production cost decrease (59% for oil-red
generation), although average hourly load would increase along with the cor-
responding NOx and SO2 emissions (but CO2 emissions decrease). Although
RTP programs have a great potential for bill savings, it is amazing that only
few of them have managed to attract and maintain customer participation.
A recent study among 48 utilities in the U.S. shows that, although reductions
of 12-33% were achieved, one third of the programs had no participants at all
(see Figure 5.5 while 28% of the programs were about to be terminated [5].
Some of the reasons for that include poor marketing and customer support as
well as program eligibility limitations that led to the attraction of the largest
industrial customers. Severin Borenstein has conveyed a number of experi-
ments to quantify the risk associated with RTP [72]. Bill volatilities are to be
expected even in at tari settings due to the changing consumption habits,
but it is true that RTP prices increase these values due to their stochastic
nature (two to four times according to Borenstein). However, his results
show that hedging can cover more than 80% of price volatility in customers'
bills. The amount of hedging is directly proportional to the customer's load
correlation with spot prices. More specically, Borenstein has utilized data
from real industrial and commercial customers as well as spot prices from
33California power exchange during the period 2000-2003. He has then created
articial, revenue equivalent at and TOU rates along with xed, forward
prices (using the actual average spot price for the observed period) and sets
hedging volume equal to the customers' CBLs. According to his ndings
over-hedging can further decrease price volatility.
Figure 5.4: Real time pricing tari.
Two-Part Real-Time Pricing
The main problem with RTP is that clients are usually risk-averse and
do not wish to see large deviations in their monthly bills. Additionally, free
riders can exploit RTP benets and obtain prot without altering their con-
sumption habits [73]. Hence, an innovative RTP tari that has been utilized
in the industry is the two-part RTP tari (Figure 5.6) also known as Block-
and-Index Pricing, which was rst introduced under revenue neutrality by
Niagara Mohawk Power Co. in 1988, with a program called Hourly Inte-
grated Pricing Pilot (HIPP) [74, 5, 75, 3] for industrial clients under the
SC-3A option. According to this tari, customers pay their previous stan-
dard (usually TOU) rate for a xed baseline load (which is usually their
average historical demand before entering the program) and then, each hour
per day, they are charged proportionally to their deviation from this baseline
load at a price close to but higher than both the market and real-time tar-
is. Hence, customers are able to hedge their risk for the majority of their
load and then eciently trade their deviations, inducing DR. In this case
34Figure 5.5: Number of participants per RTP program [5].
35it is extremely important to select the best suited historical baseline prole
in a transparent way so that customers are not able to game utilities. In
its rst implementation, this tari included two types of costs, namely the
marginal cost of energy and the marginal outage cost (equal to the product
of the value of lost load and the loss of load probability), and was combined
with a xed, pre-determined CBL, however a variety of issues arises when
customers intentionally alter their load pattern before entering the program.
This is why, nowadays, a historical average of the previous ten non-event
days is used most of the time and appropriate adjustments are made to the
calculated baseline load so as to align it with the most recent consumption
pattern. However, more sophisticated techniques are needed for high vari-
ability customers [5, 50]. Suppliers are the intermediates between generators
and customers, so retail risk management is also an essential part of their
business. Common retail hedge contracts include price caps, that set a max-
imum price threshold to protect customers from extremely high spot prices,
as well as price collars that include both a minimum and maximum price to
protect themselves from low wholesale prices. Additionally, customers can
pay indexed prices on other fuel or production output as well as contracts for
dierences that give customers the possibility of exchanging real-time prices
for xed ones. Ins some cases, customers are oered contracts for buying
and selling CBL amounts. Nevertheless, these hedges, called price protec-
tion products (PPPs) are currently limited to industrial clients [76, 69, 5]. In
other cases, customers are able to select the percentage of their CBL used for
hedging. The latter type of pricing is called unbundled RTP with self-selected
CBL or build-your-own (BYO) two-part tari [69, 77, 66] and is equivalent
to a standard forward contract. A summary of common hedging instruments
used along with their corresponding risk levels are illustrated in Figure 5.7.
At this point we should note that Georgia Power which has been using this
tari for its industrial customers was the only utility to achieve signicant
customer participation in its program [78].
Time varying taris can be categorized based on two attributes, gran-
ularity and timeliness [77]. The former refers to the rate of intra-day or
intra-week price change whereas the second is linked to the time between
price announcement and implementation. Hence, at and minute-to-minute
RTP rates can be seen as the two extreme points in the continuum of pos-
sible taris. Both attributes contribute to the accuracy of the price signal
to be sent. Ideally, a tari should provide reasonable time for customers to
respond to the signals and should be accurate enough to reect marginal
36Figure 5.6: Two-part real-time pricing tari [6].
costs of production and delivery.
5.1.6 Distributed Generation Taris
Finally, we should mention two types of taris for DG customers, namely
sell-back and standby rates [66]. The former refers to the price that a cus-
tomer with onsite generation ability should receive to inject power back to
the grid whereas the latter deals with the problem of proper charging DG
clients for the absence of generation due to maintenance reasons.
37Figure 5.7: Hedging instruments and corresponding risk levels [7].
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Experiments
In this chapter we investigate the eects of dierent taris in a realistic
setting. More specically, we provide an abstract but realistic model of the
wholesale market and observe the results of rate enforcement on a population
of consumer agents.
6.1 Experimental Setting
For our experiments we have used real electricity load data from a nei-
bourhood provided by a privately owned utility located in Hampshire as part
of the Intelligent Decentralised Energy-Aware (iDEaS) project1. These data
correspond to the half-hourly consumption (48 data points per day) of 7752
customers for the period January - March 2010. However, due to incon-
sistency issues, we had to remove corrupted data and kept corresponding
loads for 5933 agents. Whenever data was missing, we have replaced them
with the customer's average load for the same month. Figure 6.1 illustrates
the average aggregate demand and corresponding volatility. The results for
weekdays and weekends are plotted separately, as consumers behave simi-
larly during working days but have dierent habits on their weekends. We
can see that there is an apparent peak during the afternoon when most of
people return to their homes and turn on their appliances. The estimated
distribution of the loads and their volatility (i.e. standard deviation) for all
available data is shown in Figure 6.2. The estimation of the probability den-
sity function (pdf) is based on the Parzen window method [79]. The pdf
1http://www.ideasproject.info/
39seems to be leptokurtic with a positive skewness due to the extremely high
load and volatility of a small customer percentage.
Figure 6.1: Average aggregate load and volatility for weekdays/weekends.
Next, we tried to model customer bills under the four major types of
taris, namely at, TOU, RTP and two-part RTP. We have split the data in
weekly periods to be able to better monitor bill changes. Hence, Figures 6.3
- 6.8 illustrate the aggregate loads and volatilities observed for each week per
month. The form of the consumption is similar for each week in a month,
however we can see higher peaks during January, probably because of the
weather conditions. This is not true for volatility though, where we can see
higher deviations between dierent weeks. Moreover, the volatility for the
weekends seems to be higher than weekdays, as consumer habits can vary
over these days.
Flat rates actually correspond to forward contracts, so we needed a way
to model forward prices. According to the theory, the price of a forward
price, F(t), should be:
F(t) = E[S(t)]e
rt (6.1)
where E[S(t)] is the expected spot price, r the interest rate and t the
time to maturity (in years). We make the simplied assumption that the
40Figure 6.2: Load and volatility estimated probability density function for
weekdays/weekends.
utility buys a unique forward contract for the whole period (3 months). This
means that t = 0:25. The interest rate is assumed to be r = 2%. To get
the expected spot price, we have obtained the real wholesale price data for
the previous year (2009) 2. Figure 6.9 illustrates the estimated distribu-
tion of the log-prices from which we can clearly infer that prices follow the
log-normal distribution, as was anticipated [80, 25]. This means that the
expected wholesale price will be:
E[S(t)] = e
+ 2
2 (6.2)
where  is the mean and 2 the variance of the prices. Based on this nd-
ing, Figure 6.10 shows our half-hourly expected spot prices used to calculate
the at rate. The latter should be equal to the retail forward break-even
price (RF), i.e. real wholesale price with no costs of delivery incorporated
[8]:
2http://www.electricity.org.uk
41Figure 6.3: Average aggregate load for weekdays/weekends per week during
January.
42Figure 6.4: Average aggregate volatility for weekdays/weekends per week
during January.
43Figure 6.5: Average aggregate load for weekdays/weekends per week during
February.
44Figure 6.6: Average aggregate volatility for weekdays/weekends per week
during February.
45Figure 6.7: Average aggregate load for weekdays/weekends per week during
March.
46Figure 6.8: Average aggregate volatility for weekdays/weekends per week
during March.
47RF =
47 P
i=0
F(t)L(t)
47 P
i=0
L(t)
(6.3)
where L(t) is the utility's average aggregate load for each half hour t.
At this point we should mention that we have not incorporated transmission
and distribution costs in our model, because of the complexity of this market,
although these account for 30% and 10% respectively of a typical customer
bill [81]. However, these rates should be identical for all types of taris and
do not inuence the quality of our results.
The corresponding TOU rate was designed such that it is revenue neutral
in expectation to the customers. We consider a rate with on-peak prices
starting in eect from 8 a.m. until 8 p.m. and have calculated both on-
peak and o-peak prices using the aforementioned formula, which gave as an
on-peak to o-peak ratio of 1:456.
RTP rates correspond to the real spot prices for the period under investi-
gation as they were obtained from NETA website3. Finally, for the two-part
RTP tari, we have incorporated two types of CBL, one for weekdays and
one for weekends, based on each customer's last week's average consumption
data.
As Figure 6.11 depicts, each tari bears a dierent level of risk for the
utility. Flat (also known as ip-the-switch) rates demand an accurate long-
term prediction of electricity prices and quantities consumed, whereas the
RTP (spot) rate induces much lower risk. Hence, it seems appropriate to
include dierent levels of risk premiums for each type of tari. According to
Ahmad Faruqui [9], hedging cost premiums should be an exponential func-
tion of the load volatility, price volatility as well as the correlation between
demand and wholesale prices. A Monte Carlo simulation can provide us with
the distribution of risk premiums (Figure 6.12) and typical values are 15%,
8% and 3% for at, TOU and RTP taris respectively. Hence, we have used
these values in our model.
Our results are illustrated in Figures 6.13 and 6.14 for the bills charged
and corresponding bill volatilities respectively. As can be seen from the
rst gure, RTP tari is better than at and TOU rates in terms of the
expenses for the customers as the tails of the pdf are much shorter. TOU rate
3http://www.bmreports.com/
48Figure 6.9: Estimated pdf of wholesale daily log-prices for 2009.
Figure 6.10: Half-hourly forward prices.
49Figure 6.11: Risk-dierentiated rates [8].
Figure 6.12: Estimated pdf of hedging premia via Monte Carlo simulation
[9].
50results are in turn better than at rates, so we validate that even a modest
DR application can increase bill savings. This is apparently better for the
two-part RTP tari which seems to provide benets for the vast majority
of clients. The high skewness of this distribution shows that only a small
percentage with the highest volatility will pay more under this tari, which
is in accordance with our desire for social welfare. Results are also better for
the volatility values where both RTP taris are better than TOU and at
rates. However, two-part RTP has the narrowest distribution, meaning that
it is able to minimize customers' associated risk.
Figure 6.13: Weekly customer bill distribution.
Finally, we were interested in studying the possibility of combining at
or TOU prices with RTP ones so that prot is maximized and at the same
time risk is minimized. So, we have used Markowitz framework to achieve
this. Markowitz portfolio theory states that investors who wish to construct
a portfolio of stocks are interested in both maximizing their prot and mini-
mizing their risk [82]. This means that they could prefer lower prot but less
volatile stocks against protable but risky ones. More precisely, Markowitz
considers an investor who has a dened initial capital and has to distribute
this capital in a number, n, of provided stocks, each with an expected prot,
ri;i = 1;:::;n. The problem considered for a solution can be formally formed
51Figure 6.14: Weekly customer bill volatility distribution.
as nding the weights wi, i = f1;:::;ng, of the following maximization prob-
lem in Linear Programming standard form:
maxw
0r (6.4)
s:t:
n X
i=1
wi = 1 (6.5)
wi  0 (6.6)
where r is the vector of expected returns, and wi, the percentage of capital
to be invested on stock i. Markowitz has proved that there is a series of
portfolios that achieve this target based on customer's risk aversion, which
lie in a region called the ecient frontier.
In our case, we have multiplied customers' weekly load with corresponding
prices per tari. The resulting time series can be viewed as stocks with
varying degrees of prot and volatility. What we want to achieve is minimize
cost (which is equivalent to maximize prot) while minimizing the risk, taking
the corresponding point on Markowitz ecient frontier. To achieve this,
we have utilized Matlab's frontcon function. However, low RTP volatilities
and high at-rate hedging premiums had as a result the degeneracy of the
model to a single point, as the best portfolio for all customers was the one
52that included 100% RTP taris, validating once again the need for its full
adoption in residential settings.
53Chapter 7
Conclusions - Future Work
In the previous chapters we have made an attempt to provide an analyt-
ical description of current electricity system as well as the new Smart Grid.
We have limited our attention to the trading of electricity and more speci-
cally on how novel taris, currently oered in a limited number of industrial
customers in the U.S. could increase DR penetration in a residential setting.
It is important to note that, although much work has been done in the
AI community, the majority of the research is focused on the evolution of the
system, sometimes sacricing the accuracy of wholesale market models, which
tend to be unrealistic and make the results questionable. On the other hand,
economists and nancial engineers develop exhaustive and accurate models
that eectively capture the market dynamics but only in the short-term. It
is our belief that this new system needs an interdisciplinary approach and in
our work we have tried to preserve market reality to a satisfying extense.
Our results depict that RTP and especially two-part RTP tari is an
eective pricing mechanism. So, given that the government promotes smart
meter installation programs, alleviating the problems of installation cost, it
is our belief that this rate will soon become widely used.
As a future work we would rst like to investigate how customers hav-
ing onsite generation facilities could optimally respond to each type of RTP
tari so that both their prot is maximized and bill volatility is minimized.
Moreover, customer strategies on how to select the most appropriate price
protection product and optimize their desired percentage of CBL to hedge
their risk are denitely one of our rst priorities.
Customers exhibit two main types of volatility, namely an intra-day and
an inter-day one. The former refers to their daily consumption pattern where
54dierent peaks can be observed and lead to extremely high spot prices. The
inter-day volatility refers to their load deviations between dierent days.
Hence, a customer might have a desirable at load prole but can be quite
unpredictable, thus contributing to the volumetric risk that the utility faces,
which is quite important as the majority of trading is performed via long-
term forward contracts. A proper, fair pricing mechanism for this type of
risk should be designed and it would be intruiguing to see how customers
would respond to this tari, creating a coevolving population of customers
and utilities. Finally, a realistic modeling of transmission and distribution
markets would be an important addition to our ndings.
55Bibliography
[1] Rahimi, F., Ipakchi, A.: Demand Response as a Market Resource Under
the Smart Grid Paradigm. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 1(1) (2010)
82{88
[2] Fleten, S.E., Lemming, J.: Constructing forward price curves in elec-
tricity markets. Energy Economics 25(5) (2003) 409 { 424
[3] Commission, F.E.R.: Assessment of demand response and advanced
metering. Technical Report AD-06-2-000, FERC (August 2006)
[4] Borenstein, S.: To What Electricity Price Do Consumers Respond?
Residential Demand Elasticity Under Increasing-Block Pricing. Unpub-
lished MS. University of California, Berkeley (2009)
[5] Barbose, G., Goldman, C., Neenan, B.: A survey of utility experience
with real time pricing. Technical Report Paper LBNL-54238, awrence
Berkeley National Laboratory (2004)
[6] Goldman, C., Hopper, N., Bharvirkar, R., Neenan, B., Boisvert, D.,
Cappers, P.: Customer strategies for responding to day-ahead mar-
ket hourly electricity pricing. Technical Report Paper LBNL-57128,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2005)
[7] Goldman, C., Hopper, N., Sezgen, O., Moezzi, M., Bharvirkar, R.: Cus-
tomer response to day-ahead wholesale market electricity prices: Case
study of rtp program experience in new york. Technical Report Paper
LBNL-54761, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(June 2004)
[8] Eakin, K., Faruqui, A.: 1. In: Pricing Retail Electricity: Making Money
Selling a Commodity. Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000) 5{32
56[9] Faruqui, A.: The ethics of dynamic pricing. The Electricity Journal
23(6) (2010) 13 { 27
[10] Lui, T., Stirling, W., Marcy, H.: Get smart. Power and Energy Maga-
zine, IEEE 8(3) (may-june 2010) 66 {78
[11] EUCommission: Investing in the development of low carbon technologies
(set-plan). Technical Report Commission Documents COM(2009) 519
Final, Commission of the European Communities (October 2009)
[12] Fox-Penner, P.: Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and
the Future of Electric Utilities. Island Press (2010)
[13] Block, C., Bomarius, F., Bretschneider, P., Briegel, F., Burger, N.,
Fey, B., Frey, H., Hartmann, J., Kern, C., Plail, B., Praehauser, G.,
Schetters, L., Sch opf, F., Schumann, D., Schwammberger, F., Terzidis,
O., Thiemann, R., van Dinther, C., von Sengbusch, K., Weidlich, A.,
Weinhardt, C.: Internet der Energie - IKT f ur die Energiem arkte der
Zukunft. BDI-Drucksache 418, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
e.V. (BDI) (12 2008)
[14] Gellings, C.W.: The Smart Grid: Enabling Energy Eciency and De-
mand Response. The Fairmont Press (2009)
[15] Miller, J.H., Page, S.E.: Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction
to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton Studies in Complex-
ity). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA (2007)
[16] Wooldridge, M., Jennings, N.R.: Intelligent agents: Theory and prac-
tice. Knowledge Engineering Review 10(2) (1995) 115{152
[17] Kirschen, D., Strbac, G.: Fundamentals of Power System Economics.
Wiley (2004)
[18] Harris, C.: Electricity Markets: Pricing, Structures and Economics.
Wiley Finance (2006)
[19] Hunt, S., Shuttleworth, G.: Competition and Choice in Electricity.
Wiley, Chichester (1996)
[20] Simmonds, G.: Regulation of the uk electricity industry. Technical
report, University of Bath (2002)
57[21] Brigham, B., Waterson, M.: Strategic change in the market for domestic
electricity in the uk. Technical report, University of Warwick (February
2003)
[22] Bunn, D., Oliveira, F.: Agent-based simulation-an application to the
new electricity trading arrangements of England and Wales. IEEE
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation 5(5) (2001) 493{503
[23] Giulietti, M., Grossi, L., Waterson, M.: Price transmission in the uk
electricity market: was neta benecial? Technical report, Dept. of
Economics, University of Warwick (September 2009)
[24] Karakatsani, N.V., Bunn, D.W.: Modelling the volatility of spot elec-
tricity prices. Technical report, Dept. of Decision Sciences, London Busi-
ness School (March 2004)
[25] Pilipovi c, D.: Energy risk: Valuing and managing energy derivatives.
McGraw Hill (2007)
[26] Deng, S., Oren, S.: Electricity derivatives and risk management. Energy
31(6-7) (2006) 940 { 953
[27] Harp, S., Bringnone, S., Wollenberg, B., Samad, T.: SEPIA: A Simula-
tor for Electric Power Industry Agents. IEEE Control Systems Magazine
20(4) (2000) 53{69
[28] Watkins, C.J.C.H., Dayan, P.: Q-learning. Machine Learning 8 (1992)
279{292 10.1007/BF00992698.
[29] Nicolaisen, J., Petrov, V., Tesfatsion, L.: Market power and eciency in
a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction
pricing. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on 5(5) (Octo-
ber 2001) 504 {523
[30] Conzelmann, G., North, M., Boyd, G., Cirillo, R., Koritarov, V., Macal,
C., Thimmapuram, P., Veselka, T.: Simulating strategic market be-
havior using an agent-based modeling approach. In: 6th IAEE Euro-
pean Energy Conference on Modeling in Energy Economics and Policy,
Zurich. Number September (2004) 1{14
58[31] Sueyoshi, T., Tadiparthi, G.R.: An agent-based decision support system
for wholesale electricity market. Decision Support Systems 44(2) (2008)
425 { 446
[32] Sun, J., Tesfatsion, L.: Dynamic testing of wholesale power market
designs: An open-source agent-based framework. Computational Eco-
nomics 30 (2007) 291{327 10.1007/s10614-007-9095-1.
[33] Weidlich, A., Sensfu, F., Genoese, M., Veit, D.: Studying the eects of
CO2 emissions trading on the electricity market: A multi-agent-based
approach. In Antes, R., Hansjurgens, B., Letmathe, P., eds.: Emissions
Trading. Springer New York (2008) 91{101
[34] Zhou, Z., Chan, W., Chow, J.: Agent-based simulation of electricity
markets: a survey of tools. Articial Intelligence Review 28(4) (2007)
305{342
[35] Weidlich, A., Veit, D.: A critical survey of agent-based wholesale elec-
tricity market models. Energy Economics 30(4) (2008) 1728 { 1759
[36] Veit, D.J., Weidlich, A., Yao, J., S.Oren, S.: Simulating the dynamics in
two-settlement electricity markets via an agent-based approach. Inter-
national Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management
1(2) (2006) 83{97
[37] Czernohous, C., Fichtner, W., Veit, D.J., Weinhardt, C.: Management
decision support using long-term market simulation. Information Sys-
tems and E-Business Management 1 (2003) 405{423
[38] Vytelingum, P., Ramchurn, S.D., Voice, T.D., Rogers, A., Jennings,
N.R.: Trading agents for the smart electricity grid. In: The Ninth In-
ternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2010). (May 2010) 897{904
[39] Gode, D.K., Sunder, S.: Allocative eciency of markets with zero-
intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual ratio-
nality. Journal of Political Economy 101(1) (February 1993) 119{137
[40] Vytelingum, P., Cli, D., Jennings, N.: Strategic bidding in continuous
double auctions. Articial Intelligence 172(14) (2008) 1700 { 1729
59[41] Vytelingum, P., Voice, T.D., Ramchurn, S.D., Rogers, A., Jennings,
N.R.: Agent-based micro-storage management for the smart grid. In:
The Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
agent Systems (AAMAS 2010). (May 2010) 39{46
[42] Kamboj, S., Pearre, N., Kempton, W., Decker, K., Trnka, K., Kern,
C.: Exploring the formation of Electric Vehicle Coalitions for Vehicle-
To-Grid Power Regulation. In: First International Workshop on Agent
Technologies for Energy Systems (ATES 2010). (2010)
[43] Vandael, S., Boucke, N., Holvoet, T., Deconinck, G.: Decentralized
demand side management of plug-in hybrid vehicles in a Smart Grid. In:
First International Workshop on Agent Technologies for Energy Systems
(ATES 2010). (2010)
[44] Vytelingum, P., Ramchurn, S.D., Rogers, A., Jennings, N.R.: Agent-
based homeostatic control for green energy in the smart grid. In:
First International Workshop on Agent Technologies for Energy Sys-
tems (ATES 2010). (2010)
[45] Hirsch, C., Hillemacher, L., Block, C., Schuller, A., M ost, D.: Simula-
tions in the Smart Grid Field Study MeRegio Simulationen im MeRegio
Smart Grid Feldtest. Information Technology 52(2) (2010) 100{106
[46] Faruqui, A., George, S.S.: The Value of Dynamic Pricing in Mass Mar-
kets. The Electricity Journal 15(6) (2002) 45{55
[47] Kirschen, D.: Demand-side view of electricity markets. Power Systems,
IEEE Transactions on 18(2) (May 2003) 520 { 527
[48] Albadi, M., El-Saadany, E.: A summary of demand response in elec-
tricity markets. Electric Power Systems Research 78(11) (2008) 1989 {
1996
[49] Braithwait, S.: Behavior modication. Power and Energy Magazine,
IEEE 8(3) (2010) 36 {45
[50] Goldberg, M.: Measure twice, cut once. Power and Energy Magazine,
IEEE 8(3) (may-june 2010) 46 {54
[51] Vickrey, W.: Responsive pricing of public utility services. The Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1) (1971) pp. 337{346
60[52] Schweppe, F., Tabors, R., Kirtley, J.: Homeostatic control for electric
power usage. IEEE Spectrum 19(7) (1982) 44{48
[53] Caramanis, M., Bohn, R., Schweppe, F.: Optimal spot pricing: Practice
and theory. Power Apparatus and Systems, IEEE Transactions on PAS-
101(9) (sep. 1982) 3234 {3245
[54] Schweppe, F.C., Tabors, R.D., Caramanis, M.C.: Evaluation of spot
price based electricity rates. Power Engineering Review, IEEE PER-
5(7) (jul. 1985) 28 {28
[55] Schweppe, F., Caramanis, M., Tabors, R., Bohn, R.: Spot pricing of
electricity. Kluwer academic publishers (1988)
[56] Spees, K., Lave, L.B.: Demand response and electricity market e-
ciency. The Electricity Journal 20(3) (2007) 69 { 85
[57] Hamidi, V., Li, F., Robinson, F.: Demand response in the UK's domestic
sector. Electric Power Systems Research 79(12) (2009) 1722{1726
[58] Reform, E..R.: Digest of united kingdom energy statistics. Technical
report, Department for Business (2007)
[59] Hammerstrom, D., Ambrosio, R., Carlon, T., DeSteese, J., Horst, G.,
Kajfasz, R., Kiesling, L., Michie, P., Pratt, R., Yao, M., Others: Pacic
Northwest GridWise Testbed Demonstration Projects; Part I. Olympic
Peninsula Project. Report PNNL-17167, Pacic Northwest National
Laboratory (October 2007)
[60] Jazayeri, P., Schellenberg, A., Rosehart, W., Doudna, J., Widergren, S.,
Lawrence, D., Mickey, J., Jones, S.: A survey of load control programs
for price and system stability. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on
20(3) (August 2005) 1504 { 1509
[61] Tan, Y., Kirschen, D.: Classication of Control for Demand-side Par-
ticipation. University of Manchester 29 (2007)
[62] Goel, L., Wu, Q., Wang, P.: Reliability enhancement of a deregulated
power system considering demand response. In: IEEE Power Engineer-
ing Society General Meeting. (2006) 6
61[63] Faruqui, A., po Chao, H., Niemeyer, V., Platt, J., Stahlkopf, K.: Ana-
lyzing california's power crisis. Energy Journal 22(4) (2001) 29{52
[64] Hirst, E.: Price-responsive demand in wholesale markets: Why is so
little happening? The Electricity Journal 14(4) (2001) 25 { 37
[65] Hirst, E.: The nancial and physical insurance benets of price-
responsive demand. The Electricity Journal 15(4) (2002) 66 { 73
[66] Braithwait, S., Hansen, D., O'Sheasy, M.: Retail electricity pricing
and rate design in evolving markets. Technical report, Edison Electric
Institute (July 2007)
[67] Services, I.G.B., eMeter Strategic Consulting: Smart price pilot nal
report. Technical report, Ontario Energy Board (July 2007)
[68] Caves, D.W., Herriges, J.A., Kuester, K.A.: Load shifting under vol-
untary residential time-of-use rates. The Energy Journal 10(4) (1989)
83{100
[69] Borenstein, S., Jaske, M., Rosenfeld, A.: Dynamic pricing, advanced
metering and demand response in electricity markets. Technical report,
University of California Energy Institute (2002)
[70] Allcott, H.: Real time pricing and electricity markets. Technical report,
Harvard University (2009)
[71] Holland, S.P., Mansur, E.T.: The short-run eects of time-varying prices
in competitive electricity markets. Technical Report CSEM WP 143R,
University of California Energy Institute, (May 2006)
[72] Borenstein, S.: Customer risk from real-time retail electricity pricing:
Bill volatility and hedgability. Technical Report CSEM WP 155, Cen-
ter for the Study of Energy Markets (CSEM), University of California
Energy Institute (July 2006)
[73] Woo, C.K., Chow, P., Horowitz, I.: Optional real-time pricing of elec-
tricity for industrial rm. Pacic Economic Review 1 (1996) 79{92
[74] O'Sheasy, M.T.: How to buy low and sell high. The Electricity Journal
11(1) (1998) 24 { 29
62[75] Barbose, G., Bharvirkar, R., Goldman, C., Hopper, N., Neenan, B.:
Killing two birds with one stone: Can real-time pricing support retail
competition and demand response? Technical Report Paper LBNL-
59739, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2006)
[76] Mauldin, M.G.: Retail risk management: pricing electricity to manage
customer risk. The Electricity Journal 10(5) (1997) 78 { 83
[77] Borenstein, S.: Time-Varying Retail Electricity Prices: Theory and
Practice. Electricity deregulation: choices and challenges (2005) 317
[78] Barbose, G., Goldman, C., Bharvirkar, R., Hopper, N., Ting, M.: Real
time pricing as a default or optional service for commercial and indus-
trial customers: a comparative analysis of eight case studies. Techni-
cal Report Paper LBNL-57661, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(August 2005)
[79] Bowman, A.W., Azzalini, A.: Applied smoothing techniques for data
analysis: the kernel approach with S-Plus illustrations. Volume 18 of
Oxford statistical science series. Oxford University Press, Walton Street,
Oxford OX2 6DP, UK (1997)
[80] Hull, J.: Options, futures, and other derivatives. Pearson Prentice Hall
(2008)
[81] Salies, E., Waddams Price, C.: Charges, costs and market power in the
deregulated uk electricity retail market. Technical report, EconWPA
(2004)
[82] Markowitz, H.: Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7(1) (1952) 77{91
63